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THE IMPACT OF STATE FARM V. ALEXANDER ON
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
GENERALLY, AND IN TO RELATION TO THE OWNED-BUT-
NOT-INSURED EXCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its decision in January, 1992, State Farm v. Alexander's broad
holding has puzzled many jurists and practitioners as to its scope and effect.
While the law stated in the syllabus 2 of Alexander seems clear enough,
an automobile insurance policy may not eliminate or reduce uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverage, required by R.C. 3937.18, to
persons injured in a motor vehicle accident, where the claim or claims
of such persons arise from causes of action that are recognized by
Ohio tort law,3
the question arises as to whether Alexander's prohibition applies to all exclusions
in an automobile insurance policy which violate R.C. § 3937.18's purpose4, or
whether Alexander's interdiction is specific only to "household exclusions" -
which was the specific exclusion at issue in the facts of Alexander.6 If one
subscribes to the notion that the plain meaning of the syllabus should apply, then
any exclusion violative of the uninsured motorist statute's purpose should be void
as against public policy. As such, the discussion contained herein will
commence with a brief examination of the uninsured and underinsured motorist 7
statute's purpose.
Following the discussion of the uninsured motorist statute's purpose, the
discussion will proceed to survey all cases to date which have had occasion to
deal with Alexander in a substantive manner. Nine of the twelve Ohio appellate
districts have considered the Alexander decision in some respect.8 Likewise, the
1 583 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1992).
2 See Thackery v. Helfrich, 175 N.E. 449 (Ohio 1931) (the syllabus of an Ohio Supreme Court opinion states
the law in Ohio).
3 Alexander, 583 N.E.2d at 309.
4 OIO1 REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18 (Baldwin 1992). See infra text accompanying notes 11-29.
5 Generally, "household exclusions" contained in the uninsured motorist section of a policy eliminates coverage
based on the fact that the insured's automobile is covered under the liability section of the policy and the vehicle
is owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured, his spouse or any relative which resides with the
named insured. The purpose for such an exclusion is to prevent collusive claims among family members.
6 Alexander. 583 N.E.2d at 311.
7 Henceforth the author shall refer only to the uninsured motorist statute for simplicity. While differences do
exist between the uninsured and underinsured motorist sections of R.C. § 3937.18, the legislative purpose of
both is identical, as discussed infra. See infra text accompanying notes 11-29.
8 See infra part m B.
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Ohio Supreme Court has cited to Alexander as authority for reversing appellate
court decisions which upheld exclusions violative of R.C. § 3937.18's purpose.9
Each decision shall be presented and examined in turn, grouped either by Ohio
Supreme Court decision or by appellate district.
Subsequently, the discussion will turn its focus to Alexander's impact on the
"owned-but-not-insured" exclusion contained in most automobile liability
policies. t Case law established prior to Alexander will be explored and will
attempt to be reconciled with Alexander if possible. Intertwined, a survey of case
law from other jurisdictions outside of Ohio which have dealt with this exclusion
will be presented, though by no means in an exhaustive sense. This discussion
will focus in part on the premise that uninsured motorist coverage is not risk
related as is liability coverage, and that uninsured motorist coverage is portable,
following the insured person and not the insured vehicle.
II. THE PURPOSE OF OHIO'S UNINSURED
MOTORIST LAW - R.C. § 3937.18
Ohio Revised Code § 3937.18 1I mandates insurance carriers offer uninsured
motorist coverage to their insureds.12 Stated numerous times in Ohio case law,
the legislative purpose of R.C. § 3937.18 is to provide uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage for injured persons who have a legal cause of
action against a tortfeasor, but who are uncompensated because the tortfeasor is
either not covered by liability insurance or covered in an amount that is less than
the insured's uninsured motorist coverage.' 3 In other words, the objective of
uninsured motorist coverage is to place the insured in the same position he would
have been in had the tortfeasor had insurance coverage.' 4
9 See infra part In A.
10 See infra part IV.
11 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A) (Baldwin 1992) provides, in relevant part:
(1) Uninsured motorist coverage... shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to the
automobile liability... coverage and shall provide protection for bodily injury ..., for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury...;
(2) Underinsured motorist coverage... shall be in an amount of coverage equivalent to the
automobile liability ... coverage and shall provide protection for an insured against loss for
bodily injury .... where the limits of coverage available or payment to the insured under all
liability bonds and insurance policies covering persons liable to the insured are less than the
limits for the insured's uninsured motorist coverage at the time of the accident. ...
1 2 Alexander, 583 N.E.2d at 311.
13 Id. at 312; Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.E.2d 665,666 (Ohio 1973); Rowe v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio CL App. 1990); Ware v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 514 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986).
1 4 See cases cited supra note 13.
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Any contractual restrictions on full uninsured motorist coverage must be
approved by the Ohio Legislature. Otherwise, any policy limitation should
comply with R.C. § 3937.18's purpose.1 5 Any restrictions in the policy that
deviate from the statute's requirements will be unenforceable.' 6 Therefore, the
validity of a policy exclusion depends on whether the exclusion conforms to the
requirements of R.C. § 3937.18.17 Upon inspection of R.C. § 3937.18(G), t8 it is
apparent that the Ohio Legislature has expressly provided for only one
permissible exclusion or limitation to uninsured motorist coverage, namely the
permission to preclude stacking of uninsured motorist benefits.' 9 Based on the
existence of only one permissible exclusion, a strict interpretation would suggest
that no other exclusions are authorized. If one subscribes to this construction,
then State Farm v. Alexander sets forth the clearest interpretation of the
legislative intent of R.C. § 3937.18 to date.
From Alexander, particularly the syllabus, 20 only two requirements must be
present to determine if the insured is entitled to recover uninsured motorist
benefits. First, the injured insured must have a legal cause of action against the
tortfeasor.21 Second, the injured person must be "uncompensated because the
tortfeasor is either (1) not covered by liability insurance or (2) covered in an
amount that is less than the insured's uninsured motorist coverage. "22 Thus,
Alexander expresses, in no uncertain terms, that the uninsured motorist statute is
based upon the underlying premise of the tortfeasor's legal liability to the
insured."23
In Alexander, State Farm denied uninsured motorist benefits to its insured
under the automobile liability policy it issued to the policyholder based upon a
"household exclusion."24 The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that State Farm had
a duty under R.C. § 3937.18 to provide the insured with the uninsured motorist
coverage expressly contracted for.25 The Court concluded that this exclusion
violated R.C. § 3937.18's purpose because it impermissibly attempted to change
15 Ady v. West Am. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ohio 1982).
16 Sexton v. State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ohio 1982).
17 Alexander. 583 N.E.2d at 311.
18 OHIO R EV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(G) (Baldwin 1992) provides: "Any automobile liability or motor vehicle
liability policy of insurance that includes coverages offered under division (A) of this section may include terms
and conditions that preclude stacking of such coverages." (emphasis added.)
19Id.
2 0 See supra text accompanying note 3.
2 1 Alexander, 583 N.E.2d at 312.
22 Id
23 Id. See also Kurrent v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, 581 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio 1991).
2 4 Alexander, 583 N.E.2d at 311. The household exclusion contained in the policy eliminated uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage based solely on the fact that the insured's automobile was covered under the
liability section of the policy and furnished for the regular use of the insured or his family. Id.
25 Id at 312.
Winter/Spring, 19931
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Ohio tort law through contractual definition and the Court thereby voided the
exclusion. 26
Some may argue that Alexander's holding was specific to household
exclusions only, thus invalidating only that particular exclusion. However, those
proponents fail to consider the framework which the Court set when it shaped the
issue early in Alexander as follows:
The sole issue before the court is whether State Farm may, by policy
definition, eliminate uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage to
persons injured in a motor vehicle accident where the claim or claims
of such persons arise from causes of action that are recognized by
Ohio tort law.27
Neither the issue stated by the Court, nor the holding as presented in the syllabus
show any intent on the part of the Court to limit the invalidation to household
exclusions only. As further evidence for this conclusion, decisions prior to
Alexander in which the Court adjudged whether an exclusion was valid or invalid
identify the specific exclusion in its holding or issue. 28 Alexander did not
identify one specific exclusion. Instead, the Court expresses what some consider
to be a broad, all-encompassing policy statement which addresses attempts by
insurers to contractually eliminate uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage.29
This conclusion is logically correct since the Court broke with its prior
consistency of naming specific exclusions when deciding validity or invalidity.
However, such a conclusion will gain credence only through the Ohio Supreme
Court's as well as lower appellate court's interpretations of Alexander.
26 Id.
2 7 1d. at 311.
28 Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, 513 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio 1987): "Public policy does not prevent the issuance and
enforcement of an automobile liability policy containing reasonable exclusionary clause, within the uninsured
motorist provision, prohibiting intrafarnilial recovery of damages against the insurer of the policy." (emphasis
added); Curran v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio 1971):
Where an insurer provides uninsured motorist protection, as required by R.C. § 3937.19, it may
not avoid indemnification of its insured under that coverage by including in the insurance
contract an "other insurance" clause, which, if applied, would relieve the insurer from liability in
circumstances where the insured has other similar insurance available to him from which he
could be indemnified.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986): "An insurance policy provision which
denies uninsured motorist coverage, when bodily injury is sustained by any person while occupying a motor
vehicle owned by an insured but which vehicle is not specifically insured under the policy, is a valid exclusion."
(emphasis added).
29 See, e.g., Gaddis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. L-91-165, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 797 (6th App.
Dist. Ohio Feb. 28, 1992).
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4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 9
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss3/9
IMPACT OF STATE FARM V. ALEXANDER
III. STATE FARM V. ALEXANDER CONSTRUED
A. Ohio Supreme Court Decisions Subsequent to the Rendering
of State Farm v. Alexander
The first post-Alexander instance in which the Ohio Supreme Court has had
occasion to refer to its holding from Alexander was in Wright v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. 30 Factually, this case is identical to Alexander. The insured-
plaintiff in Wright was a passenger in her own automobile being driven by a
friend. 3' The vehicle was involved in an accident in which the plaintiff suffered
injuries. 32 At the time of the accident, the plaintiff carried underinsured motorist
coverage with limits of $50,000/$100,000. 33 The driver of plaintiffs vehicle
carried an insurance policy with limits of $12,500 for which the plaintiff
settled. 34 Plaintiff then made an underinsured claim against her own insurer for
underinsured policy limits. 35 This claim was denied by plaintiffs insurer and
summary judgment was ultimately granted to the insurer-defendant. 36
The intermediate appellate court upheld the grant of summary judgment to
the insurer based upon a policy definition which excluded plaintiffs vehicle from
underinsured motorist coverage because plaintiffs vehicle was not "uninsured"
under the policy definition of "uninsured motor vehicle."37 One week after the
State Farm v. Alexander decision was handed down,38 the tenth district's ruling in
Wright was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court on the authority of State Farm
30 583 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 1992).
31 Wright v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 90AP-606, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1332, at *1-2 (10th App.
Dist. Ohio March 26, 1991), rev'd. 583 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 1992).
32 ld
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 ld.
3 6 Id. at *9.
37 Id. at *6-9. The policy in question defined an uninsured motor vehicle in relevant part as: "1. a land motor
vehicle, the ownership, maintenance or use of which is: a. not insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at
the time of the accident . I.." d. at *5. The policy goes on to provide that: "An uninsured motor vehicle does
not include a land motor vehicle: 1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 2. furnished for the
regular use of you, your spouse or any relative .... Id. at *5.
The Tenth Appellate District of Ohio, in deciding this case prior to the decision rendered by the Ohio Supreme
Court in State Farm v. Alexander based its holding on Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, 513 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio
1987), which was subsequently overruled by Alexander. The appellate court concluded that the aforementioned
policy definitions acted in effect as an exclusion to the plaintiff since they rendered her car an "insured" as
opposed to an "uninsured" vehicle. As such, under the uninsured motorist statute which requires insurers to
offer coverage to insureds legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured
vehicle, the appellate court determined that plaintiffs car had liability protection and was therefore an "insured"
vehicle, thereby precluding any underinsured recovery. Wright, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 1332 at *8-9.
3 8 State Farm v. Alexander was decided January 15, 1992 by the Ohio Supreme Court. Alexander 583 N.E.2d
at 309. Wright v. State Farm was decided January 22, 1992. Wright v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583
N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 1992).
Winter/Sping, 1993]
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v. Alexander.39 The Court provided no details other than the statement of
reversal, 40 presumably because of the factual similarities existent between Wright
and Alexander. A similar situation was presented in Woods v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co.,41 the next chronological case in which the Court relied upon Alexander.
Woods involved the same exclusion and almost identical facts contained in both
Wright and Alexander, including a judgment at the appellate level for the
insurer.42 Precisely in the same brief manner as it had done in Wright, the Ohio
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Fourth Appellate District's decision
43
for the insurer in Woods on the authority of Alexander.44 Likewise, the identical
facts, procedural history and ultimate outcome are found in Millar v. Beacon Ins.
Co. of America,45 where the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Fifth Appellate
District46 on the authority of Alexander.47
While an obvious pattern has developed as to "household exclusions," 48 the
Ohio Supreme Court has not provided any insight as to how it will apply
Alexander in cases which involve exclusions other than "household exclusions."
As such, a survey of how the various appellate districts in Ohio have applied
Alexander may lend some guidance as to how the Ohio Supreme Court may rule
in the future.
B. Ohio Appellate Court Decisions Subsequent to State Farm v. Alexander
1. Third Appellate District of Ohio
As of this writing, the Third Appellate District of Ohio has made reference
only once to Alexander. In Dion v. State Farm,49 the Third District considered
whether a policy endorsement which modified the policy definition of "an
39 Wright, 583 N.E.2d at 963.
40 Id. The exact language of the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court, in its entirety, is as follows: "The
judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court on authority of State
Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander. Id. (citation omitted).
41 590 N.E.2d 279 (Ohio 1992).
42 Woods v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1743, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5848 (4th App. Dist. Ohio Nov. 15, 1991),
rev'd. 590 N.W.2d 279 (Ohio 1992).
4 3 The Woods case on remand, Woods v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 1743, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2572 (4th App.
Dist. Ohio March 12, 1992) represents the only occasion in which the Fourth District Court of Appeals for Ohio
has referenced Alexander. Because the Fourth District summarily reversed its prior decision for the insurer in
that case on the holding contained in Alexander without any extent of substantive discussion, the author has
found little need to include an analysis of Fourth District cases in Section IlI B. of this paper.
44 Woods, 590 N.E.2d at 279.
45 592 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio 1992).
4 6 Millar v. Beacon Ins. Co. of America, No. CA-3674, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6329 (5th App. Dist. Ohio Dec.
23, 1991).
47 Millar, 592 N.E.2d at 828. At the time of this writing, Millar is the last instance in which the Supreme Court
of Ohio can be found making any reference to Alexander.
48 See supra text accompanying notes 24-39.
49 Dion v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 4-91-14, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1556 (3d App. Dist. Ohio
March 24, 1992), jurisdictional motion overruled, 596 N.E.2d 473 (Ohio 1992).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26: 3-4
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insured" was contrary to the rule announced in State Farm v. Alexander.50
Briefly, the insured in Dion was killed as a result of a collision caused by the
negligence of an underinsured motorist.5' Prior to the accident, the insurer, State
Farm, issued an endorsement to its insured which effectively eliminated claims of
persons not living with the named insured by contractually changing the
definition of "an insured". 52 As a result of this endorsement, State Farm denied
uninsured motorist benefits to the decedent-insured's children who brought an
action under Ohio's wrongful death statute. 53 State Farm contended that the
endorsement to the policy 4 contractually eliminated the decedent-insured's
children as a category of insureds as previously defined prior to the issuance of
the endorsement. 5" The trial court agreed with State Farm's assertion that the
amendment was a valid contractual limitation to the policy, and granted the
insurer summary judgment. 56 However, the Third Appellate District of Ohio
disagreed.57
The third district hinged its decision on the rule announced by State Farm v.
Alexander which prevents an auto insurer from eliminating or reducing uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverage required by Ohio law to injured persons with
recognized causes of action against the uninsured tortfeasor under Ohio tort
law. 58 The Court reasoned that the endorsement in question attempted to
5 0 1d.
5 1 1d at *1.
52 Id. at *3-5. State Farm contended that the endorsement eliminated the fifth category of insureds as
previously defined by the policy before the amendment was issued. The definition of "insured" prior to the
endorsement was as follows:
Insured -- means the person or persons covered
by uninsured motor vehicle coverage.
This is:
I. the first person named in the declarations;
2. his or her spouse;
3. their relatives; and
4. any other person while occupying:
a. your car, a temporary substitute car, a newly acquired car, or a trailer attached to such car...
b. a car not owned by you, your spouse or any relative, or a trailer attached to such a car. It has
to be driven by the first person named or that person's spouse ....
Such other person occupying aa vehicle used to carry persons for a charge is not an insured.
5. any person entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury to an insured under I
through 4 above.
Id at 3 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at *3-6. The decedent-insured was divorced and living apart from his ex-wife at the time of his death.
Likewise, decedent-insured's children did not live with him and were therefore precluded from recovering
benefits as "relatives" under the policy which required relatives to live in the insured's household in order to be
insureds.
54 See supra note 52.
5 5 Dion, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1556 at *5-6.
56 us
57 1,. at 12-13.
581& at*,,.
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preclude the insured-decedent's beneficiaries from recovering under their
wrongful death claim, a valid legal cause of action under Ohio tort law. 9 As
such, the Court concluded that State Farm's policy amendment was contrary to
the rule of law set forth in Alexander and void as against the intent of R.C. §
3937.18.60 Thus, for the first time, an appellate court invalidated a policy
provision somewhat different6t than the Alexander "household exclusion" by
utilizing the broad authority of the Alexander syllabus.
2. Fifth Appellate District of Ohio
In Stagg v. Riddlebarger,62 the Fifth Appellate District invalidated a policy
definition of "uninsured automobile." 63 The definition in question prevented a
vehicle listed in the declarations of the policy from ever qualifying as an
uninsured vehicle even when the vehicle was involved in a one-car accident. 64
The fifth district found that the insurance company's rationale for denying
coverage in this case was the same as in Alexander,65 and the Court therefore
required the insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage to the insured. 66
The plaintiff-insured in Stagg also raised an assignment of error stating that
"the 'family exclusion' contained within the definitional provisions of uninsured
motorist coverage67 is void as a blatant contravention of statutory mandates and
public policy." 68 The Court held that Alexander did not require courts to strike
all "family exclusion" language as a matter of law and public policy. 69 The Court
reasoned that it was possible for such an exclusion to be valid, enforceable and
not against public policy under uninsured motorist coverage, particularly if the
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Here, the policy provision was one which defined who is "an insured."
62 No. CA-3706, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2592 (5th App. Dist. Ohio May 7, 1992), jurisdictional motion
overruled, 600 N.E.2d 679 (Ohio 1992).
63 ld
64 Id. at *2. The policy stated that "insured vehicle" means: "(a) an automobile described in the policy for
which a specific premium charge indicates that coverage is afforded . I..." d. The policy also went on to state
that an "uninsured vehicle" did not include: "(1) an insured automobile or an automobile furnished for the
regular use of the named insured or a relative ...." Id
65 Id. at *4. That is, to contractually eliminate a vehicle which the insured has listed on the declarations page of
his policy from ever being uninsured because of the mere reason that the vehicle is insured under the
declarations.
66 ld
67 Id. at *5. While the court did not specifically quote the "family exclusion" language contained in the
uninsured motorist coverage section of the policy, the court did recite the "family exclusion" language contained
in the liability coverage section of the policy, as follows: "this policy does not apply under [liability] ... (k) to
bodily injury to any person who is related by blood, marriage or adoption to the insured if that person resides in
the named insured's household at the time of loss." Id The author contends that it is reasonable to assume that
the language of the "family exclusion" above, contained in the liability policy is virtually identical to the
"family exclusion" contained in the uninsured motorist coverage section.
68 Id.
69 Id.
[Vol. 26: 3-4
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liability portion of the policy did not exclude coverage to family members.70
Indeed it goes without saying, if the liability section of an auto insurance policy
did not contain a "family" or "household" exclusion, 71 an injured family member
would never find a need to resort to an attempt to collect under the uninsured
section of the policy since coverage would be available under the liability
section. Thus, the fifth district declined to extend its holding beyond the stricture
of Alexander.72
What is interesting is Stagg's reluctancy to apply Alexander's syllabus in its
broad sense. It would seem that even if the liability portion of a policy did not
contain a "family exclusion," the fact that the uninsured motorist coverage did
contain such an exclusion would violate Alexander's mandate that a policy may
not contractually eliminate uninsured motorist coverage to an uncompensated
insured with a legal cause of action against the tortfeasor. Arguably, Alexander's
syllabus requires that uninsured motorist coverage restrictions be examined
without reference to any other provisions contained in other sections of the
policy, including the liability coverage section, in order to determine validity.
As such, it is debatable whether, as the fifth district contends, a "family
exclusion" can ever be a valid exclusion.
3. Sixth Appellate District of Ohio
While it has invalidated "household exclusions" 73 on the command of State
Farm v. Alexander, the Sixth Appellate District has gone further than most other
appellate districts in applying Alexander's broad syllabus to other uninsured
motorist coverage exclusions and limitations. In Delacerva v. State Auto Mut.
Ins. Co.,74 the sixth district concluded that an "intrafamilial exclusion"75 was
against public policy under the Alexander holding. 76 The Court's deduction was
70 id.
71 These terms are used synonymously when courts have discussed the type of exclusion which eliminates
coverage to members of a named insured's household.
72 Stagg, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIs 2592 at *5.
73 See Porter v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 91WD106, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3405 (6th App. Dist.
Ohio June 30, 1992) (invalidating' a household exclusion contained in the uninsured motorist coverage section
of the policy issued to the insured, basing its decision on the authority of the syllabus of State Farm v.
Alexander declaring such exclusions are against public policy).
7 4 No. 90-WD-097, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 413 (6th App. Dist. Ohio Feb. 7, 1992).
75 Id. at *3. The intrafamilial exclusion in this case provided that: "[An] 'uninsured motor vehicle' [a
requirement to collect under the uninsured motorist coverage of the policy] does not include any vehicle or
equipment: 1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any 'family member."' Id.
76 ld. at *5-6. The trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment prior to the decision of State
Farm v. Alexander being rendered. As such, the trial court relied upon Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, 513 N.E.2d
1324 (Ohio 1987), overruled by State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309 (Ohio 1992), which
expressly provided that intrafamilial exclusions contained within an uninsured motorist provision of an
automobile liability policy are valid and not against public policy. Ild. However, as previously stated, State
Farm v. Alexander expressly overruled the second paragraph of the syllabus in Finch which states that "[plublic
policy does not prevent the issuance and enforcement of an automobile liability insurance policy containing a
Winter/Spring, 1993]
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founded on the fact that the exclusion eliminated the insured's uninsured motorist
coverage, thereby violating R.C. § 3937.18 and causing the exclusion to be
unenforceable. 77
The* next occasion in which the sixth district relied on Alexander was in
Farley .v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co.. 78 There, the insurer sought to deny
uninsured motorist coverage to the policyholder's children whose mother, the
policyholder, had instituted a loss of parental consortium claim against the
tortfeasor on the children's behalf.79 The insurer based its denial of coverage
upon policy language omitting uninsured motorist coverage for minor children of
the named insured under certain conditions. 80 The insured, however, claimed
that the definition of "insured" used in the policy did not afford uninsured
motorist coverage to her minor children to the same extent that it afforded
coverage to the named insured herself and was therefore contrary to the intent of
R.C. § 3937.18.81 The court of appeals reasoned that since the children's loss of
consortium claim was a claim which was entitled to be compensated under Ohio
law, and that the policy restrictions in question ignored the driver-tortfeasor's
legal liability to the insured's minor children, the policy in effect divested the
children of their ability to bring an uninsured motorist claim under the policy.82
This effect, said the Court, conflicted with R.C. § 3937.18, just as the "household
exclusion" contained in the insurance policy in State Farm v. Alexamer did, the
result of which caused the restriction on coverage to be unenforceable.83
Similarly, the sixth district struck down an exclusion other than the
"household exclusion" in Gaddis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co..84 First, the
Court invalidated a limiting definition of "uninsured motor vehicle," which it
found to be the same provision State Farm unsuccessfully relied upon in
reasonable exclusionary clause, within the uninsured motorist provision, prohibiting intrafamilial recovery of
damages against the issuer of the policy." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
77 Delacerva. 1992 Ohio App LEXIS 413 at *5-6.
78 No. L-90-323, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 848 (6th App. Dist. Ohio Feb. 21, 1992), rev'd 597 N.E.2d 86 (Ohio
1992).
79 Id. at * 1-2. In this case, the children's (plaintiffs') father was divorced from the children's mother at the time
when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident which left him a quadrapeligic. Neither the father nor the
driver of the vehicle in which he was a passenger had automobile insurance. Debbie Farley, as parent and next
friend of her minor children, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment asking the court to declare that the
minors had a valid uninsured motorist claim against Debbie Farley's insurer for the children's loss of their
father's care, support, love, affection and consortium as a result of the uninsured tortfeasor-dMivers negligence.
Id.8 0 Id. at *32-35. The policy omitted coverage for minor children of the named insured when not occupying the
insured vehicle or when they were not present in another car driven by the named insured.
81 Id. The named insured argued that she was provided uninsured motorist coverage for any injury, including
derivative claims such as loss of consortium, caused by an uninsured motorist, whereas her children were not
afforded the same coverage due to the policy definition of "insured." Id
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 No. L-91-165, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 797 (6th App. Dist. Ohio Feb. 28, 1992).
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Alexander.85 Next, the Court determined that an exclusion known as an "owned-
but-not-insured" exclusion 86 was against public policy.87 Stating that although
the Court's opinion in Alexander was not directly on point, the Gaddis Court
commented that the syllabus of that opinion was quite broad. 88 As such, it
reasoned that the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion at issue must fail, as did the
"household" exclusion in Alexander.89 The Court went on to express the notion
that Alexander made it clear that the focus in determining whether uninsured
motorist coverage is applicable should be on the status of the tortfeasor, not on
the status of the various vehicles. 90
The Gaddis decision is one of the leading cases decided thus far which
gives full force and effect to Alexander's broad syllabus. Gaddis extends
Alexander's mandate to exclusions other than the "household" exclusion and
other exclusions which attempt to eliminate uninsured motorist coverage by
excluding the policyholder, his family, or their vehicle as an "insured" or
"uninsured vehicle" under the uninsured motorist coverage section of the policy.
In fact, one can see what seems to be a willingness on the sixth district's part,
especially from Gaddis, to apply the Alexander principals by focusing on the
status of the tortfeasor, not the status of the various vehicles. 9'
4. Eighth Appellate District of Ohio
On two occasions, 9 2 the Eighth District Court of Appeals has negated
attempts by insurers to exclude uninsured motorist coverage based upon policy
definitions of "uninsured vehicles. '93 In both instances, the eighth district, citing
State Farm v. Alexander, concluded that the insurer was attempting to
contractually exclude coverage for torts that occur in the insured's vehicle.
94
Both Courts rendered the exclusions unenforceable because the exclusions
85 Id. at *6. The limiting definition of "uninsured motor vehicle" stated that: "[A] uninsured motor vehicle
does not include a land motor vehicle: 1. insured under the liability coverage of this policy; 2. furnished for
the regular use of you ... your spouse or any relative." Id
86 Id. at *10. The "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion in question provided: "We do not provide Uninsured
Motorists Coverage for bodily injury sustained ... while occupying, or when struck, by a car owned by you or
any family member which is not insured for this coverage under this policy." Id.
87 Id.
88 l Gaddis cites to Thackery v. Helfrich, 175 N.E.2d 449 (Ohio 1931) which held that the syllabus of an
opinion of the Supreme Court states the applicable law.
89 Id
901,d
91 See supra part I B. 3.
92 Worldwide Ins. Group v. Duchak, No. 60565, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2221 (8th App. DisL Ohio April 30,
1992); Lawrence v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 60439, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1988 (8th App. Dist. Ohio April 16,
1992).
93 In both Worldwide Ins. Group v Duchak and Lawrence v. Safeco Ins. Co., the uninsured motorist section of
the policy precluded recovery by the insured since, by definition, a vehicle covered by the liability insurance
section of the policy could not be an "uninsured vehicle."
9 4 Duchak 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2221 at *6-7; Lawrence 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1988 at *10.
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attempted to avoid, and thereby conflicted with, the requirements of R.C. §
3937.18. 95
5. Ninth Appellate District of Ohio
Invalidating an exclusion which sought to avoid interspousal claims under
the uninsured motorist provision of an insurance policy, the Ninth Appellate
District in O'Connor v. Westfield hIs. Co. reversed a lower Court's decision
upholding the insurer's attempt to contractually limit uninsured motorist
coverage.96 In that case, the insurer sought to contractually eliminate coverage
through a limiting policy definition of an "uninsured vehicle" which prevented a
vehicle furnished for the use of a family member from ever being classified as an
"uninsured vehicle."97 The trial Court correctly rendered its decision for the
insurer on the authority of Dairvland Ins. Co. v. Finch,98 the state of the law prior
to the Ohio Supreme Court's ruling in Alexander." However, prior in time to the
Plaintiffs appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned the Alexander decision.1'°
The Ninth District took notice of Alexander which expressly overruled the
provision in Finch upon which the trial Court had based its ruling.'0 ' As such,
the appellate court reversed the trial court and invalidated the policy exclusion
since its conflicted with the Ohio Uninsured Motorist Statute's purpose.t
6. Tenth Appellate District of Ohio
On three occasions thus far, the Tenth Appellate District has found cause to
cite to Alexander, 10 3 however only two of the cases provide any substantive
insight into construction of uninsured motorist policy exclusions. 1°4. In Windsor
95 In effect, both of the policies in these cases sought to avoid R.C. § 3937.18 requirements by causing the
policyholder's vehicle to become "uninsured" under the statute when the insurer denied coverage under the
liability portions of the insurance policies, but then defining the vehicle as "insured" under the uninsured
motorists portions of the policies thereby precluding coverage. See Duchak 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2221 at *7;
Lawrence 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 1988 at *11.
9 6 O'Connor v. Westfield Ins. Co., No. 3140,1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3140 (9th App. Dist. Ohio June 17,1992).
97 Id. at *2. Westfield Insurance Co. attempted to deny coverage to the insured who was injured while riding as
a passenger in a car driven by her husband, the tortfeasor in the action. Westfield based its denial of coverage
on a "family exclusion" contained in an endorsement to the policy claiming that the Plaintiff, Mrs. O'Connor,
was excluded pursuant to the policy definition of an uninsured vehicle. Id.
98 513 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio 1987).
99 Id.
100 O'Connor 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3140 at *34.
101 Id.
102 Id. The court cited Alexander which stated that Finch was decided incorrectly because it conflicted with
R.C. 3937.18 by allowing the insurer to contractually eliminate uninsured motorist coverage where one spouse
became legally liable to the other for personal injuries. Id.
103 Leahy v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., No. 91AP-1359, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6740 (10th App. Dist. Ohio
Dec. 22, 1992); Windsor Ins. Co. v. Henry, No. 92AP-173, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4071 (10th App. Dist. Ohio
Aug. 6, 1992); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Porter, No. 91AP-1441, 1992 Ohio App. LExIS 3959 (10th App. Dist. Ohio
July 28, 1992).
104 See Leahy, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6740 Henry, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4071.
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Ins. Co. v. Henry, the tenth district considered the validity, under the provisions
of the Ohio Financial Responsibility Act, 105 of an "intrafamilial exclusion"
contained in the liability, as opposed to the uninsured motorist, section of the
insurance policy in question.10 6 The Henry Court upheld the exclusion stating
that the rationale expressed in Alexander related only to exclusions of uninsured
and underinsured motorist coverage, and in no way affected the validity of an
exclusionary clause in the liability section of the insurance policy. 0 7 While this
decision is correct as it relates to Alexander's effect on exclusions contained in
the liability portion of an insurance policy, it is interesting to note that Henry
may have narrowly construed Alexander when it stated that Alexander "held that
a 'household exclusion' violated the provisions of R.C. 3937.18.0t8 It is not
apparent whether Henry construes the holding to apply only to "household
exclusions," or if the Court was merely singling out the particular exclusion at
issue in Alexander to provide factual background without intending to limit the
holding to one particular type of exclusion. Thus, it will be necessary to observe
how the Tenth District construes Alexander in later cases.
In addition to Henry, the tenth district construed Alexander in Leahy v.
United Servs. Auto Ass'n. 10 9 In Leahy, the policy in question expressly limited
uninsured motorist coverage to bodily injury to the insured and family members
who resided in the named insured's household.110 Factually, the Plaintiffs father
was killed as the result of an accident with an uninsured motorist."' Plaintiff
was an emancipated adult child at the time of the accident and did not reside in
the same household with his father."12 As such, the Defendant-insurer denied
coverage under the "covered person" definition because Plaintiffs father was not
a "covered person" unless he resided in the Plaintiffs household. 13 In upholding
the trial court's invalidation of this coverage restriction, the tenth district relied
upon the purpose of the Ohio Uninsured Motorist Statute as stated in
Alexander."4 Since Plaintiff had suffered the loss of his father for which he was
uncompensated due to the lack of insurance coverage on the tortfeasor's behalf,
105 See OHIO R EV. CODE ANN. Ch. 4509 (Baldwin 1992).
106 Henry, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 4071 at *24.
107 Id. The court stated that the liability coverage intrafamilial exclusionary clause was valid and enforceable
under the first paragraph of Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch which survived the Ohio Supreme Court decision in
Alexander. Ild.
108 id.
109 No. 91AP-1359, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6740 (10th App. Dist. Ohio Dec. 22, 1992).
110Id.
111 Id. at*2.
112/d.
113 lit at *4.
114 Id. at *7. The court relied upon language in Alexander which "identified the purpose of R.C. 3937.18 to be
that of providing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage for injuredpersons who have a legal cause of
action against a tortfeasor, but who are uncompensated because the tortfeasor is either (1) not covered by
liability insurance or (2) covered in an amount that is less than the insured's uininsured motorist coverage." ld.
(quoting State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ohio 1992)).
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and because Plaintiff had a legal cause of action against the uninsured tortfeasor
through a wrongful death action, the Court concluded that the policy's coverage
restriction did not comply with the statute's purpose and was therefore
unenforceable.' 15
7. Eleventh Appellate District of Ohio
In Weed v. State Farm Ins. Co.,1 16 the Eleventh District Court of Appeals
considered a fact situation nearly identical to that in Alexander.1 7 As in
Alexander, the Plaintiff in Weed was denied coverage because of explicit
language in the policy excluding the policyholder's vehicle from being an
"uninsured motor vehicle" since it was the policyholder's own vehicle furnished
for her own regular use.118 Under State Farm's "household exclusion," Weed
noted that an insured's own vehicle could never be an "uninsured vehicle" in a
one-car accident.119 As such, the Court found that State Farm's attempt to
exclude uninsured motorist coverage for torts that occur in the insured's vehicle
violated the coverage requirements of R.C. § 3937.18, the same as it did in
Alexander. 120
Two weeks after Weed, the eleventh district decided Mezerkor v.
Mezerkor 2 which involved the legality of an "intrafamilial exclusionary
clause." 122  Like the decisions rendered by other Ohio appellate districts
previously mentioned which have considered similar "intrafamilial
exclusions,"' 23 the Mezerkor Court found this exclusion to be void because an
insurer may not contractually eliminate uninsured motorist coverage where one
spouse becomes legally liable to the other for personal injuries. 24 To do so
would deny coverage to a class of plaintiffs under Ohio tort law who would
otherwise be entitled to recovery.1 25
1151d
116 No. 91-L-108, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3226 (1lth App. Dist. Ohio June 19, 1992).
117 Id. Both Weed and Alexander involved one car automobile accidents in which the plaintiff-policyholder
was injured while riding as a passenger in his own vehicle, and the driver of the plaintiff-policyholder's vehicle
was uninsured. Additionally, in both cases, the insurer, State Farm, denied coverage claiming that the
policyholder's vehicle did not meet the policy's definition of an "uninsured vehicle." Id.
118 id. at *2.
119 Id. at *4.
120 Id. at *5.
121 No. 90-G-1560, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3422 (11 th App. Dist. Ohio June 30, 1992).
122 Id.
123 See cases cited supra notes 60-65, 67-70, 88-93, 96-99 and accompanying text.
1 2 4 Mezerkor, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 3422 at *15-16.
125 Id. at * 15 (citing State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ohio 1992)).
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8. Twelfth Appellate District of Ohio
In addition to the Gaddis opinion previously discussed,1 26 the decision
rendered by the Twelfth Appellate District of Ohio in Nationwide Ins. Co v.
Tobler127 is likewise extremely useful in examining the extent to which Ohio
appellate courts are willing to extend the broad holding and rationale of
Alexander. The Tobler Court held that pursuant to Alexander, an exclusion to
uninsured motorist coverage based upon the use of a motor vehicle without
permission is invalid. 128 Tobler concluded that if the insured was entitled to
recover damages due to the tortious conduct of an uninsured motorist, but would
be uncompensated because of the tortfeasor's lack of liability insurance, then the
issue of whether the victim was driving with permission was irrelevant.1 29 This is
so because to hold such an exclusion valid would be to preclude recovery under
Ohio tort law and thus contravene the provisions of R.C. § 3937.18.130 In
addition to Tobler, the twelfth district also invalidated a "household exclusion
clause" in Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Johnson'3' on grounds substantially similar to
those already discussed in Weed'32 and LeahV33.
IV. THE IMPACT OF STATE FARM V. ALEXANDER ON THE
"OWNED-BUT-NOT-INSURED" EXCLUSION
Examine any automobile liability insurance policy containing uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverage and you will find a myriad of exclusions
contained within it. While the number of possible exclusions is certainly finite, it
is beyond the constraints of this paper to attempt to examine every possible
exclusion and the impact which the State Farm v. Alexander ruling has had upon
it. As such, a representative exclusion, the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion,
has been chosen in order to examine, in detail, to what extent State Farm v.
Alexander invalidates exclusions other than the "household" exclusion which
Alexander unquestionably invalidated.
Thus, the question to be examined is whether the "owned-but-not-insured"
vehicle exclusion contained in the uninsured motorist coverage provision of an
automobile liability insurance policy is contrary to the intent of R.C. 3937.18,
and therefore, void as against public policy. Undoubtedly, the contention will be
126 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
127 Nos. CA91-09-068, CA91-09-069, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2929 (12th App. Dist. Ohio June 8, 1992),
jurisdictional motion overruled, 600 N.E.2d 686 (Ohio 1992).
128 Id. at * 17.
129id.
130 Id.
131 No. CA92-06-115, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 6006 (9th App. Dist. Ohio Nov. 30, 1992).
132 See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 100-106 and accompanying text.
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made by insurers that a literal interpretation of the broad syllabus from
Alexander, which would invalidate "owned-but-not-insured" exclusions, would
expand coverage in a way inconsistent with the uninsured motorist statute's
purpose. These contentions and valid concerns will be addressed herein.
One case often cited in numerous jurisdictions for setting forth insightful
rationales for examining the validity of uninsured motorist exclusions is Bradley
v. Mid-Century Ins. Co..134 Bradley plainly states that "[tihe legislative objective
in enacting [Michigan's] uninsured [motorist] amendment [sic] was that all
persons be protected against the negligent uninsured motorist."'135 This language
is parallel to that cited from Ohio case law in Alexander and other Ohio case law
decisions.136 Bradley also states that the insurer's obligation to provide uninsured
motorist coverage is tied to liability coverage for the "purpose of facilitating the
purchase of uninsured [motorist] coverage and determining who must be
provided with uninsured [motorist] coverage."' 137 Further, insurers are not
permitted to limit uninsured motorist coverage to situations in which liability
coverage would be in effect. t 3s This indicates that liability and uninsured
motorist coverages are distinct and separate coverages. Bradley clarifies this
point when it states:
The legislative declaration that no policy shall be delivered unless
coverage is provided for the protection of persons "insured
thereunder" leaves no room for contractual limitations modifying the
generality of 'insured thereunder' or exclusions based on circumstances
of the accident. The words 'insured thereunder' refer to persons
primarily insured for public liability by the policy and not to the
circumstances or times that the public liability coverage is actually
operative . . . The amendment contemplated that all such persons
would have fully portable coverage. 13 9
Bradley clearly delineates the same reasoning relied upon by an Ohio Court in
Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bittler. 140
When an insurance carrier provides liability and bodily injury coverage
under an automobile liability policy, the insured status of the vehicle is
undoubtedly important. If the vehicle is not named in the policy and a premium
134 294 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1980).
135 Id. at 150.
136 See Bartlett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 294 N.E.2d 665, 666 (Ohio 1973); Rowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 583 N.E.2d 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Ware v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 514 N.E.2d 440 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986).
137 Bradley. 294 N.W.2d at 151.
138 1,L
139 Id. (emphasis added).
140 235 N.E.2d 745 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio C.P. 1968).
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is not paid, no liability insurance attaches. However, compare liability insurance
with uninsured motorist coverage, which is not limited to the circumstances or
times when liability coverage is actually operative.' 41 As Justice Fogleman
pointed out in his well-reasoned dissent in Holcomb v. Farmers Ins.Exchange,42
[a] motorist who purchases liability insurance on his automobile does
so for the benefit of an unidentified third party. On the other hand, the
motorist who purchases uninsured [motorist] coverage does so for his
own benefit.. .uninsured motorist insurance is not liability insurance.
To the contrary, it is, in effect, accident and health insurance, very
similar to automobile medical payments insurance. 143
It is clear that the uninsured motorist coverage required has nothing to
do with the vehicle for which the liability policy is issued. 144
The decision rendered by the Ohio Supreme Court in Hedrick v. Motorists
Mutual Ins. Co.'45 has often been cited as authority for the validating "owned-
but-not-insured" exclusions. However, it can be debated that Hedrick failed to
make the distinction between liability coverage and uninsured motorist coverage
as Justice Fogleman pointed out in Holcomb. If this is the case, then the majority
in Hedrick erroneously upheld the "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion in that
case.
In a four to three decision, the majority in Hedrick held that "an insurance
policy provision which denies uninsured [motorist] coverage, when bodily injury
is sustained by any person while occupying a motor vehicle owned by an insured
but which vehicle is not specifically insured under the policy, is a valid
exclusion.' 146 Hedrick involved an accident between an insured motorcyclist and
an uninsured automobile. 147 The motorcyclist-insured was injured as a result of
the negligence of the uninsured motorist. 48 The motorcycle, owned by the
injured cyclist's father, was insured for both liability and uninsured motorist
coverage. 49 Following the accident, the insurer of the motorcycle paid uninsured
motorist benefits to the insured.' 50  The insured then sought to recover
uncompensated benefits through a separate insurance policy issued to his father
141 Id.
142 495 S.W.2d 155, 160-61 (Ark. 1973) (Fogleman, J., dissenting).
143 Id. (quoting Winslow Drummond, Uninsured Motorist Coverage-A Suggested Approach to Consistency,
23 ARK.L. REV. 167, 189 (1969)).
144 Id. at 161.
145 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1988).
146 Id at 843.
147 ld at 840.
148 Id.
149 Id
1501Id.
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which covered two automobiles." 1 This second policy contained an "owned-but-
not-insured" exclusion upon which the insurer denied the insured uninsured
motorist coverage. 15 2
The Ohio Supreme Court recognized the exclusion in Hedrick to be in
accordance with the purpose of R.C. § 3937.18.1'3 The Court reasoned that the
insured was attempting to "stack" coverage in violation of an anti-stacking
provision contained in the policy. 54 The Court then noted that the legislature did
not include a definition of "stacking" in the statute. 155 As such, the Court relied
upon the definition of "stacking" set out in Karabin v. State Automobile Mut. Ins.
Co. 156 to interpret the meaning. 15 7 Karabin defined "stacking" to be "the lumping
or adding together of payments or the aggregation of coverage."'158 Hedrick also
noted that "a common thread running through those cases determining whether
an insured was entitled to stack uninsured motorist coverage was the fact that the
insured was seeking payment under more than one policy of insurance." 5
9
In Hedrick, the insured was indeed trying to stack coverage. The insured
had first collected uninsured motorist benefits under the motorcycle insurance
policy, then he attempted to collect the same benefits under the automobile
insurance policy.' 60 However, had there been only one policy at issue which
contained an "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion, a different result may likely
have arisen. In the scenario where only the policy exists, the insured would not
be attempting to collect and stack coverage under two insurance policies. For the
second policy, the insured paid an additional premium to receive uninsured
motorist coverage to protect him against negligent uninsured motorist. Because
the majority in Hedrick based its decision to uphold the "owned-but-not-insured"
exclusion on the fact that the insured could not stack uninsured motorist
coverages, 161 the scenario of a single insurance policy set forth above cannot be
properly decided under the Hedrick holding.
151 Id
152 ld.
153 Id. at 842.
154 Id. at 843. R.C. 3937.18(G) expressly permits insurance companies to include provisions in their policies
to prohibit the stacking of insurance coverage. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(6) (Baldwin 1992).
1 5 5 Hedrick 488 N.E.2d at 843.
156 462 N.E.2d 403 (Ohio 1984).
1 5 7 Hedrick 488 N.E.2d at 843.
158 Karabin, 462 N.E.2d at 406.
1 5 9 Hedrick 488 N.E.2d at 842. See Karabin, 462 N.E.2d at 403; Ady v. West Am. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 547
(Ohio 1982); Grange Mut. Casualty Co. v. Volkmann, 374 N.E.2d 1258 (Ohio 1978); Curran v. State Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co., 266 N.E.2d 566 (Ohio 1971).
160 See supra text accompanying notes 102-109.
161 See supra text accompanying notes 154-160.
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In addition to this factual distinction between the scenarios set forth above,
State Farm v. Alexander should not permit Hedrick to be relied upon if it acts to
enforce a policy restriction that varies from the R.C. § 3937.18's requirements.
The "owned-but-not-insured" exclusion attempts to deny coverage based upon
the status of a vehicle. As such, it effectively ignores the insured's negligence
claim against the tortfeasor and violates the rule of Alexander. Where the
exclusion seeks to contractually eliminate uninsured motorist coverage to a
category of plaintiffs having a valid tort claim under Ohio law, Alexander renders
these exclusions in conflict with R.C. 3937.18 and therefore void. 1 62
It has been pointed out at great length thus far that under the plain meaning
of the law set forth in Alexander, an insurer cannot eliminate uninsured motorist
coverage to the insured who is injured in a motor vehicle accident due to the
negligence of an uninsured motorist. As evidence that Alexander went further
than the mere invalidation of the "household exclusion," the syllabi of both
Alexander and Hedrick must be dissected. The Alexander syllabus states in no
uncertain terms that an insurer "may not eliminate or reduce uninsured or
underinsured [motorist] coverage .... "163 The syllabus in Hedrick instead
focuses on a certain type of exclusion, namely the "owned-but-not-insured"
exclusion, and does not attempt to set forth general, broad policy as does
Alexander. 164
Since Alexander is a post-Hedrick decision, and its language is very specific
in forbidding any contractual elimination of underinsured motorists coverage,
65
there can be little doubt that the Hedrick decision has been inferentially overruled
by the Ohio Supreme Court in Alexander. Under Alexander, the type of
exclusion has no effect if the insured has a recognized cause of action against the
tortfeasor under Ohio tort law. 166 As further support that Alexander exhibits
more than a mere invalidation of the "household exclusion," it is helpful to
examine Justice Douglas's position in both Alexander and Hedrick. Justice
Douglas, writing for the narrow majority in Hedrick, appears to have re-
examined his position and sided with Justices Sweeney and Brown, who
dissented very sharply in Hedrick. 167 This is evidenced by his concurrence in the
majority opinion by Justice Brown in Alexander.168 Surely, Justice Douglas was
aware of his decision in Hedrick when he concurred in Alexander's broad
162 State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ohio 1992).
163 1& at 309.
16 4 Hedrick v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 488 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio 1986).
165 Id.
166Alexander, 583 N.E.2d at 309.
16 7 Hedrick 488 N.E.2d at 843 (Celebrezze, C.J., Sweeney, J. and Brown, J. dissenting).
16 8 Alexander. 583 N.E.2d at 313.
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repudiation of any attempt by insurers to eliminate or reduce uninsured motorist
coverage to persons injured due to negligent uninsured motorist. 169
As additional support that Hedrick has succumb to the rule in Alexander is
the interpretation of Alexander found in Gaddis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co..170 In Gaddis, the Sixth District Court of Appeals for Ohio declared an
exclusion with virtually identical language to the one being examined void based
upon Alexander. 171 The Gaddis Court stated that "although the Court's opinion in
Alexander ..is not directly on point, the syllabus of that opinion is quite broad.1
72
It indicates that these [owned-but-not-insured] exclusions must too fail." 173
It is true that Gaddis does not undertake to examine Alexander with a fine-
tooth comb; however, arguments that the language of Gaddis is simply too
cursory are not persuasive. It is interesting nevertheless to ponder why the Sixth
District Court of Appeals made no mention of the Hedrick decision which
explicitly spoke to the validity of "owned-but-not-insured" exclusions. It may be
validly asked if perhaps the Gaddis Court overlooked the Hedrick decision.
Upon examining the case law cited in Gaddis, it would seem that there is no
possible way that the Gaddis Court could not have considered Hedrick.
Alexander was decided approximately six weeks before Gaddis.174 Since
Alexander was new law and explicitly overruled Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, it is
more than reasonable to assume that the Gaddis Court examined the Dairyland
opinion. The Dairyland opinion cites Hedrick twice and relies upon direct
language from Hedrick.175 Thus, it may be reasoned that Hedrick was actually
considered by the Gaddis Court, but the Gaddis Court reasonably determined that
the broad language of Alexander superseded that of Hedrick. Additionally,
Gaddis cited Watson v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. 176, which also cited Hedrick.
177
In addition to the Ohio case law set forth above, it is noteworthy to address
the fact that numerous jurisdictions have invalidated "owned-but-not-insured"
exclusions. Admittedly, there has been a split of authority on the issue at hand.
However, "a significant majority of Courts [have] accepted the argument that
169 Id. at 309 (syllabus).
170 See supra text accompanying notes 76-83.
171 Gaddis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. L-91-165, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 797 (6th App. Dist. Ohio
Feb. 28, 1992).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 The Alexander decision was rendered on January 15, 1992. The Gaddis ruling followed approximately six
weeks later on February 28, 1992.
175 Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Finch, 513 N.E.2d 1324 (Ohio 1987).
176 532 N.E.2d 758 (Ohio 1988).
177 Gaddis, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 797 at *10.
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uninsured motorist vehicle coverage is personal and cannot [be] restrict[ed]
without violating public policy." 78
Higgins v. Fireman's Ins. Co. 179 stated that uninsured motorist coverage was
first-party insurance.
Basic economic benefits and other first party coverages such as
uninsured and underinsured [motorist] coverages protect and follow
the person, not the vehicle. The risk being insured by each policy
issued to an insured party is principally the risk of injury to himself or
covered members of his household. Ordinarily, an insured person
looks to his own policies or those covering him as an insured for basic
economic loss benefits and the benefits of other first party coverages
whether or not the policies are associated with the particular vehicle
involved in the accident.1 80
For support of this proposition, Higgins relied on a line of cases from Minnesota
which state the same effect.18'
As alluded to earlier, uninsured motorist coverage is not premised upon
risk, whereas motor vehicle liability coverage is. Uninsured motorist coverage is
assessed at a flat premium rate and coverage is available to everyone at the same
rate; therefore, coverage is not risk-related. 82 In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court in
Watson v. Grange Mut. Cas Co.' 83 acknowledged that uninsured motorist
coverage was not founded on risk when it stated "although the [insurance]
policies allude to accidents arising from the ownership, maintenance or use of the
[owned but] uninsured automobile, the endorsement clearly is directed toward
the uninsured motorist."' 84 Thus, the focus is not on the vehicle, but the person.
In fact, the person upon whom the focus should be placed is the tortfeasor, not
178 See Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227, 1228 (Utah 1987). See also Higgins v.
Fireman's Ins. Co., 770 P.2d 324, 327 (Ariz. 1989); Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., 449 A.2d 157, 160 (Conn.
1982); Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., 553 A.2d 1199, 1201 (Del. 1989); Employer's Fire Ins. Co. v. Baker,
383 A.2d 1005, 1008 (R.1. 1978).
179 770 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1989).
1 80 1d at 327.
181 See Hilden v. Iowa Nat'l MUL Ins. Co., 365 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Minn. 1985); American Motorist Ins. Co. v.
Sarvela, 327 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Minn. 1982) ("first party coverages for which an insured pays a premium follow
the person, not the vehicle."); Sobania v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 349 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn. CL App. 1984)
(uninsured motorists coverage is a first-party insurance scheme and covers the person, not the vehicle), affd,
371 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1985).
182 Jacobson v. Implement Dealers MuL Ins. Co., 640 P.2d 908, 911 (Mont 1982).
183 532 N.E.2d 758 (Ohio 1988).
18414 at 760.
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the victim. "R.C. 3937.18 requires an analysis of the tortfeasor's insured status
rather than the vehicle's status."'8 This observation is clearly stated in Watson:
[A]lthough the policies allude to accidents arising from the ownership,
maintenance or use of the uninsured automobile, the endorsement
clearly is directed toward the uninsured motorist. The coverage's clear
focus is on the operator, not the vehicle. It is axiomatic that drivers
cause accidents, not inanimate vehicles. The purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute is not to provide coverage for an uninsured vehicle but
rather to afford the insured additional protection in the event of an
accident...1 86
Looking at case law from a minority of other jurisdictions, it is apparent that
many of these Courts have expressed great concern over the fact that a single
uninsured motorist premium would protect all other vehicles that the insured
owns. 187 As Bradley indicated, insured's acquire their insured status when
coverage is purchased for any household vehicle.18 8 Thereafter, they are insured
no matter where they are injured. 89 Bradley remarked that one notable insurance
law commentator has addressed this "free ride" issue which the appellee asserted.
He observed:
It is difficult to accept the propriety of such a restriction on coverage.
First, the importance or value of the imputed business purposes for
this exclusion seems tenuous as applied to the purchaser who owns
more than one vehicle. Acquisition of insurance for a second vehicle
is relatively inexpensive; therefore, permitting the insurer to withhold
coverage for the small return seems of dubious merit. 190
185 Rowe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 N.E.2d 381, 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis added).
186 Watson. 532 N.E.2d at 760.
187 See, e.g.. Carlton v. Worcester Ins. Co., 744 F.Supp. 395 (D.R.I. 1990), affd. 923 F.2di (Ist Cir. 1991);
Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 495 S.W.2d 155 (Ark. 1973); Herrick v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins., 274 N.W.2d
147 (Neb. 1979); Berry v. Texas Farm Bureau MUL Ins. Co., 782 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Clark v.
State Farm MuL Auto. Ins, Co., 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987).
188 Bradley v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 294 N.W.2d 141, 152 (Mich. 1980).
18 9 Id. Bradley stated:
The status of the named insured and his relatives as persons insured against negligent uninsured
motorists is not altered by there being other family vehicles having no uninsured motorist
coverage. They acquire their insured status when coverage is purchased for any household
vehicle. [Thereafter], they are insured no matter where they are injured. They are insured when
injured in an owned vehicle named in the policy, in an owned vehicle not named in the policy, in
an unowned vehicle, on a motorcycle, on a bicycle, whether afoot or on horseback or even on a
pogo stick.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
190 Id. at 151-52 n.34 (citing ALANIWIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE §2.9, at 29
(1969).
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Even so, many continue to strongly argue that invalidating the "owned-but-not-
insured" exclusions would benefit only those who want to get something for
nothing. Contrary to these assertions, the insured who is injured while operating
an owned vehicle not expressly stated in the declarations has nonetheless paid a
premium for uninsured motorist coverage.
Again, it is important to look to the thrust of uninsured motorist coverage,
which is to protect the person with a cause of action, not the vehicle.1 91
Therefore, based upon the discussion above, it is reasonable to conclude that the
single policy insured is entitled to the uninsured motorist coverage that the Ohio
Legislature has ordered the insurer to provide and for which the insured has paid
an additional premium. Nevertheless, claims are sure to arise which will state
that had the legislature's intention been to allow for one premium to cover all
other vehicles, the legislature would have drafted the uninsured motorist statute
accordingly. However, cannot the opposite be said as well? If the legislature had
intended to exclude or limit uninsured motorist coverage, they would have so
provided in the statute. If the law should be that one uninsured motorist coverage
premium should be paid for each vehicle the insured owns, then this edict should
emanate from the Ohio Legislature, not a Court of law. 192
V. CONCLUSION
While the Ohio Supreme Court has to date offered little guidance as to the
extent to which the holding in State Farm v. Alexander will be carried, Ohio
appellate courts have read Alexander to be broad enough to invalidate a variety
of exclusions which attempt to contractually deny uninsured motorist coverage
required by R.C. § 3937.18. The legislative purpose of R.C. § 3937.18, as
interpreted under Ohio case law, is to provide uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage for injured persons who have a legal cause of action against a
tortfeasor, but who are uncompensated because the tortfeasor is either not
covered by liability insurance or covered in an amount that is less than the
insured's uninsured motorist coverage. 193 In other words, the objective of
uninsured motorist coverage is to place the insured in the same position he would
have been in had the tortfeasor had insurance coverage. Therefore, any
restrictions in the policy that deviate from the statute's requirements will be
unenforceable.' 94
191 Harvey v. Travelers Indem. Co., 449 A.2d 157, 160 (Conn. 1982) (stating that coverage is portable and the
policyholder is insured no matter where he/she is injured, even if he/she is in an owned vehicle not named in the
policy) (citing Bradley v. Mid-Century, 294 N.W.2d 41 (Mich. 1980) and Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bittler,
235 N.E.2d 745 (Cuyahoga County, Ohio C.P. 1968).
192 See, e.g., Chmielewski v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 591 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1991).
193 See cases cited supra note 9.
194 Sexton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ohio 1982).
Winter/Spring, 19931
23
Lisle: Impact of State Farm v. Alexander
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
AKRON LAW REVIEW
State Farm v. Alexander sets forth the clearest interpretation of the
legislative intent of R.C. § 3937.18 to date by defining the two requirements that
must be present to determine if the insured is entitled to recover uninsured or
underinsured motorist benefits under his own automobile liability policy. First,
the injured insured must have a legal cause of action against the tortfeasor. 95
Second, the insured must be "uncompensated because the tortfeasor is either (1)
not covered by liability insurance or (2) covered in an amount that is less than the
insured's uninsured motorist coverage."' 96 Thus, Alexander expresses, in no
uncertain terms, that the uninsured motorist statute is based upon the underlying
premise of the tortfeasor's legal liability to the insured.197
As evidence of the broad effect of Alexander's syllabus extending beyond
invalidating only "household exclusions", an analysis of Alexander's impact on
typical "owned-but-not-insured exclusions" reveals a similar invalidating effect.
The reason for this stems from the underlying objective of the Uninsured
Motorist Statute to put the victim in the same position of recovery had the
tortfeasor been adequately insured. Thus, an important distinction is made
between liability insurance purchased for the benefit of other motorists and
uninsured motorist coverage which is purchased for the insured's own protection:
Liability insurance follows the vehicle, whereas uninsured motorist insurance
coverage follows the insured personally, regardless of the vehicle occupied. It is
only under these criteria that full effect will be given to the legislative purpose of
the Ohio Uninsured Motorist Statute and the resulting coverage it requires.
SHAWN GORDON LISLE
195 State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 583 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Ohio 1992).
196 Id.
197 Id.
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